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ABSTRACT
Recent work has made great progress in verifying the for-
warding correctness of networks [19–21, 26]. However, these
approaches cannot be used to verify networks containing mid-
dleboxes, such as caches and firewalls, whose forwarding
behavior depends on previously observed traffic. We explore
how to verify reachability properties for networks that include
such “mutable datapath” elements. We want our verification
results to hold not just for the given network, but also in
the presence of failures. The main challenge lies in scaling
the approach to handle large and complicated networks, We
address by developing and leveraging the concept of slices,
which allow network-wide verification to only require analyz-
ing small portions of the network. We show that with slices
the time required to verify an invariant on many production
networks is independent of the size of the network itself.
1 Introduction
Perhaps lulled into a sense of complacency because of the
Internet’s best-effort delivery model, which makes no explicit
promises about network behavior, network operators have
long relied on best-guess configurations and a “we’ll fix it
when it breaks” operational attitude. However, as networking
matures as a field, and institutions increasingly rely on net-
works to provide reachability, isolation, and other behavioral
constraints, there is growing interest in developing rigorous
verification tools that can ensure that these constraints will be
enforced by the network configuration. The first generation
of such tools – Anteater [26], Veriflow [21], and HSA [19,20]
– provide highly efficient (in fact, near real-time) checking of
reachability (and, conversely isolation) properties and detect
anomalies such as loops and black holes. This technical ad-
vance represents an invaluable step forward for networking.
These verification tools assume that the forwarding behav-
ior is set by the control plane, and not altered by the traffic, so
verification needs to be invoked only when the control plane
alters routing entries. This approach is entirely sufficient for
networks of routers, which is obviously an important use case.
However, modern networks contain more than routers.
Most networks contain switches whose learning behavior
renders their forwarding behavior dependent on the traffic
they have seen. More generally, most networks also contain
middleboxes, and middleboxes often have forwarding behav-
ior that depends on the observed traffic. For instance, firewalls
often rely on outbound “hole-punching” to allow hosts to es-
tablish flows to the outside world, and content caches forward
differently based on whether they have previously cached the
desired content. We refer to network elements whose forward-
ing behavior can be altered by datapath activity as having a
“mutable datapath” (in contrast with static datapaths whose
behavior is fixed until the control plane intervenes), and addi-
tional examples of such elements include WAN optimizers,
deep-packet-inspection boxes, and load balancers. In short,
the behavior of a static datapath is only a function of its
configuration, while the behavior of a mutable datapath also
depends on the entire packet history that it has seen.
While classical networking often treats middleboxes as an
unfortunate and rare occurrence in networks, in reality mid-
dleboxes are the most viable way to incrementally deploy new
network functionality. Operators have turned to middleboxes
to such a great extent that a recent study [37] of fifty-seven
enterprise networks revealed that these networks are roughly
equally divided between routers, switches and middleboxes.
Thus, roughly two-thirds of the forwarding boxes in enter-
prise networks can have mutable datapaths that would not
conform to the models used in the recently developed network
verification tools. In addition, the rise of Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) [12], in which physical middleboxes
are replaced by their virtual counterparts, makes it easier to
deploy additional middleboxes without changes in the physi-
cal infrastructure. Thus, we must reconcile ourselves to the
fact that many networks will have substantial numbers of ele-
ments with mutable datapaths (and hereafter, when referring
to such elements we will call them middleboxes). Moreover,
not only are middleboxes prevalent, but they are often respon-
sible for network problems. A recent two year study [34] of a
provider found that middleboxes played a role in 43% of their
failure incidents, and between 4% and 15% of these failures
were the result of middlebox misconfiguration.
The goal of this paper is to extend the notion of verifica-
tion to networks containing mutable datapaths, so that such
middlebox misconfiguration problems can be prevented.1 Fur-
ther, these techniques should ensure correctness even in the
presence of failures, a requirement not addressed by any of
the existing network verification tools. Our basic approach,
which we call Verification for Middlebox Networks (VMN) is
1While we are extending the class of networks – to those including
mutable datapaths – we are not significantly expanding the class of
invariants to be checked; just as in the earlier works, we are focusing
on reachability and isolation.
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simple: given a topology containing both mutable datapaths
(e.g., middleboxes) and static ones (e.g., routers), we derive a
logical formula that model the network as a whole. We then
add logical formulas derived from the specified invariants so
that an invariant holds if and only if there is no satisfying
assignment for this set of logical formulas as a whole. As de-
scribed so far, this is a straightforward application of standard
program verification techniques to networks.
However, naïvely applied, this approach would not scale:
middlebox code is complex, and checking even simple in-
variants in modest-sized networks would be intractable. Thus,
our focus is on how to scale this approach to large networks.
VMN uses four techniques to scale verification:
1. Limited invariants: Rather than deal with an arbitrary
set of invariants, we focus on two specific categories that
are the dominant concerns for network operators. First, we
look at invariants describing the set of middleboxes (more
generally as a DAG of middleboxes) packets should flow
through (e.g., all http traffic should pass through a firewall
then a cache); we call these pipeline invariants. Second, we
also consider invariants that address reachability/isolation
between hosts (at the packet or content level), such as packets
from host A should not reach host B (and hereafter we will
call these reachability invariants). Our contributions relate to
verifying reachability invariants, and we rely on established
techniques to verify pipeline invariants.
2. Simple high-level middlebox models: One approach
to verifying networks with middleboxes would be to use
their full implementation to determine their behavior. This
is infeasible for two reasons: (i) most commonly deployed
middleboxes are proprietary, and we do not have access to
their code, and (ii) model checking even one such box for
even the simplest invariants would not scale.2 Therefore, we
model middleboxes using a simple abstract forwarding model
and a set of abstract packet classes used by this model. We
do not model the packet classification algorithm in middle-
boxes, and instead rely on an oracle to classify packets.3 The
forwarding models can typically be derived from a general
description of the middlebox’s behavior and can be easily
analyzed using standard techniques.
3. Modularized network models: Networks contain ele-
ments with static datapaths and elements with mutable datap-
aths. Rather than consider them all within the one verification
framework, which would overburden a system already hav-
ing trouble scaling, we treat the two separately: it is the job
of the static datapath elements to satisfy the pipeline invari-
ants (that is, to carry packets through the appropriate set of
middleboxes), which we can analyze using existing verifi-
2This assertion does not contradict the results in [11], which we
discuss later in the paper.
3A third reason we do not apply model checking to the full im-
plementation, which we discuss in the next section, is that there is
a semantic mismatch between raw middlebox code and operator-
specified invariants, which are described in terms of basic abstrac-
tions. In fact, this mismatch is what led us to the combination of an
Oracle and an abstract model.
cation tools; and it is the job of the processing pipeline to
enforce reachability invariants, and that is where we focus
our attention. Thus, our resulting system is a hybrid of current
static-datapath verification tools and our newly-proposed tool
for mutable datapaths.
4. Symmetries and Common Cases If middleboxes are
flow-parallel or origin-agnostic (both to be defined later, and
most middleboxes fall into one or both categories), we can
perform network-wide verification by examining only a small
portion of the network. This allows us to scale verification
of a single invariant to large networks. Furthermore, opera-
tional networks exhibit a great deal of symmetry in how they
are structured and in the policies they enforce. We exploit
this symmetry to reduce the total time taken for verifying all
invariants in the network. The combination of these two obser-
vations allows us to verify the correctness of large networks
in a few seconds.
Prior work, particularly Buzz [13], have described network
tools (akin to ATPG [45]) that can be applied to networks
with middleboxes; they generate test packets that (when sent)
efficiently explore whether or not invariants are violated. In
contrast, VMN provides mechanisms for verifying (akin to
HSA [19]) reachability invariants in networks with middle-
boxes. Our contributions also include slicing, which allows
verification to scale to arbitrarily large networks (through the
use of slices), and checking whether invariant hold during
failures. We provide a more detailed comparison between
VMN and other systems in §6.
In the next section, we discuss all four of these steps more
formally, and then in §3 we provide an overview of VMN. We
discuss our strategy for performing verification on smaller,
fixed size subnetworks for scalability in §4. In §5 we evaluate
VMN by verifying invariants for a variety of real-world sce-
narios. Finally we conclude in §6 and §7 with a discussion of
related work and a brief summary.
2 Our Approach
In this section we provide an overview of our approach.
2.1 Invariants
The purpose of verification is to test whether some proper-
ties (invariants) hold for a given network, where a network
is defined by both its topology (location of routers/switches
and middleboxes) and its configuration (routing tables and
middlebox settings, including how both routers and middle-
boxes respond to failures). The verification techniques em-
ployed necessarily depend on the nature of the invariants to
be checked. Thus, to understand the verification problem we
are tackling, we must first specify the class of invariants we
consider.
Verifying arbitrary invariants for networks with mutable
datapaths is undecidable4 [43], which is why we focus more
narrowly on pipeline and reachability invariants for various
4Middleboxes render the network Turing complete, so verifying
certain invariants is equivalent to solving the halting problem.
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classes of packets that are defined in terms of hosts, users,
source/destination addresses, ingress/egress ports, flows, con-
tent, application, whether or not a packet is “malicious” (as
decided, for example, by a DPI box), whether or not a packet
belonging to this flow has been seen before, and other con-
cepts. These invariants can refer to the current network con-
figuration, or be predicated on one or more failures in the
network (i.e., one can insist that reachability or pipeline in-
variant not only hold for the current network, but for all single
failures in that network).
2.2 High-Level Middlebox Models
Some invariants are defined in terms of packet classes based
only on intrinsic information — such as physical ports and
header fields — that can be precisely defined by network
operators. However, operators frequently rely on invariants
defined in terms of higher-level abstractions — such as what
user a flow belongs to, what application sent a flow, whether
the packet or flow is malicious, etc. — that depend on other
context (for instance authentication services implemented
outside of a particular middlebox), and can often not be pre-
cisely defined (whether a packet is malicious depends on
the current set of CVEs [28] and various heuristics). Using
high-level abstractions enables operators to express their in-
tent (such as to drop all malicious traffic, or drop all traffic
from a given user) without having to specify, within the in-
variant itself, the precise mechanisms used to define those
abstractions. For example, an operator may wish to drop all
Skype traffic, but does not know (or care) about the precise
mechanisms an application-level firewall uses to identify such
traffic. Therefore, to reflect how things are currently done
when configuring middleboxes or expressing policies (e.g.,
Congress [31]), we allow invariants to be defined in terms of
these higher-level abstractions.
How do we model middleboxes when their code is nec-
essarily in terms of intrinsic information but the invariants
can be in terms of higher-level abstractions? We choose to
describe middleboxes in two stages: we start with a simple ab-
stract forwarding model coupled with a set of abstract packet
classes (is a packet malicious, is it a part of a Skype flow,
etc.) and any requirements for classifying packets into this
type (e.g.,, to determine whether a packet belong to a Skype
connection the middlebox implementation needs to see all
packets in a flow). VMN then augments this model by adding
a classification oracle which is responsible for classifying
packets into these packet classes. The abstract forwarding
model describes how the middlebox operates on a packet (i.e.,
whether and where it is forwarded, and whether the header is
rewritten) given the intrinsic information (i.e., packet header
and port information), the entire packet history (since mid-
dlebox datapaths can be mutable, their behavior can depend
on packet history), and the abstractions it is assigned by the
oracle (is the packet part of a Skype flow?). The type of mid-
dlebox (e.g., firewall or load balancer) describes the basic
behaviors supported by the middlebox (for instance, which
abstractions it supports, whether it rewrites packet headers,
etc.), but the configuration of the middlebox dictates to which
class of packets these behaviors are applied.
The task of verification that we address in this paper is
whether the invariants are obeyed assuming that middlebox
implementation can correctly classify packets into abstract
types. That is, we verify network and middlebox configu-
ration, not the implementation of the abstractions. Clearly,
if a middlebox cannot correctly classify traffic (e.g., Skype
traffic) an invariant might not hold. However, this error is
not caused by network configuration but rather by bugs in
the middlebox implementation. While verifying middlebox
implementation is an important task, it is beyond the scope of
this paper. Here we focus solely on whether the overall net-
work configuration upholds invariants assuming middleboxes
are correctly implemented.
2.3 Modularized Network Models
The tools developed for static datapaths [19, 20] not only ver-
ify invariants, but also summarize the behavior of such net-
works as transfer functions. A transfer function for a network
of static datapaths maps an incoming packet on a physical
port at the edge of the network to one or more outgoing pack-
ets (perhaps with rewritten header fields) departing out one or
more physical ports at the edge of the network. Thus, we can
consider our network as a set of elements with mutable data-
paths tied together by transfer functions which represent the
behavior of the static datapath portion of the network.5 When
a failure occurs, routing in the static datapaths will change,
producing a new transfer function. Rather than model the
details of the routing algorithm, we assume we are given a
function mapping failure conditions to these new transfer
functions (e.g., a list of backup paths taken in response to
failures).
The glue provided by these transfer functions is precisely
what is responsible for enforcing pipeline invariants. In its
simplest incarnation, a pipeline invariant takes the form: all
incoming packets with a certain class of headers must pass
through the sequence of middleboxes mb1, mb2, mb3, ... be-
fore being delivered to the intended destination. More compli-
cated pipeline invariants involve a DAG of middleboxes and
specify the appropriate branching at each step (e.g., all http
packets leaving the firewall go to the load balancer, while all
other traffic goes directly to the destination). Note that these
invariants could refer to physical instances of middleboxes
(e.g., packets must traverse this particular middlebox) or a
class of middleboxes (e.g., packets must traverse a firewall).
In what follows, we will assume that all packets belonging
to the same flow are processed by the same physical pipeline
(this can be easily enforced in existing networks).
Once we have decomposed the network into a set of mid-
dleboxes connected by transfer functions, checking these
5If the static datapaths lead to a loop for a particular packet, we
raise an exception (so the network operator is aware of it) and treat
the packet as dropped.
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pipeline invariants is straightforward using existing network
verification tools. The reachability invariants are more diffi-
cult, as we discuss next.
2.4 Scaling Verification
For moderately sized networks, we can use the techniques dis-
cussed above to generate logical formulas modeling network
behavior, and other formulas corresponding to the invariants
that need to be verified. We can then use an SMT solver (e.g.,
Z3 [10]) to check if the invariants hold for the provided net-
work or not. However as the scale of the network increases,
the SMT solver has to account for an exponentially larger
state space, slowing down or preventing verification.
Inspired by compositional verification [17, 27] (which al-
lows the results from verifying components of a program to
be combined to reason about the program as a whole) we
have identified a general class of subnetworks, which we
refer to as slices, where any invariant that only references
middleboxes or endhosts contained in a slice holds for the
entire network if and only if it holds for the slice. Therefore,
we can scale network verification if given a network and an
invariant, we can find a slice whose size is independent of the
size of the network and which contains all middleboxes or
endhosts referenced by the invariant.
While slices help us rapidly verify that an individual invari-
ant holds in a network, a network might implement several
invariants. Prior work [33] has observed that many oper-
ational networks have symmetric topologies and policies.
Since the proof generated while verifying that a particular
invariant holds also applies to all other symmetric invariants,
this greatly reduces the time taken to verify the behavior of a
network allowing us to scale verification to extremely large
operational networks.
3 System Design
We model network behavior in discrete timesteps. During
each timestep a previously sent packet can be delivered to a
node (middlebox or host), a host can generate a new packet
that enters the network, a middlebox can process a previously
received packet, a failure can occur, or a previously failed
node can recover. We do not attempt to model the likely
order of these various events, but instead consider all such
orders in search of invariant violations. To do so, we invoke a
scheduling oracle that assigns a single event to each timestep,
subject to the constraint that ordering (both for receiving and
processing) is maintained for packets sent on the same link.
3.1 Overview
VMN accepts as input a set of middlebox models (§3.4), and
a set of transfer functions (§3.5) with a mapping between
failure conditions and transfer functions. VMN builds on
Z3 [29] a state of the art SMT solver. SMT solvers accept
as input a set of boolean formulae expressed in terms of a
set of variables, and then either find an assignment for the
variables such that the conjunction of these formulae is true
(a satisfying assignment) or a proof that no such assignment
exists. In this section we present our technique for convert-
ing a network and set of invariants to a set of axioms, and
producing a logical formulae including these axioms. We can
then use Z3 to check satisfiability for these formulae, where
a satisfying assignment indicates that an invariant is violated
by the network.
In VMN middleboxes and networks are modeled using
quantified formula, which are axioms describing how re-
ceived packets are treated, while the classification and schedul-
ing oracles are modeled using variables. In addition to the
network model and oracles, we also provide Z3 with the nega-
tion of the invariant, which we specify in terms of a set of
packets. Finding a satisfiable assignment to these formulae is
equivalent to Z3 finding a set of oracle behaviors that result
in the invariant being violated, and proving the formulae un-
satisfiable is equivalent to showing that no oracular behavior
can result in the invariants being violated.
The search problem solved by SMT solvers is undecidable
in general, and they rely on heuristics and timeouts to en-
sure their search procedure terminates (in which case they
are unable to determine if a problem is satisfiable or not).
Naïvely generating middlebox and network formulae might
yield formulae in an undecidable logic, preventing success-
ful verification. Therefore, one of the core contribution of
VMN lies in producing logical formulae for a wide range of
networks (and a variety of middleboxes) and invariants in a
weak logic that is expressible in Z3 and for which verification
succeeds in practice. In the rest of this section we explore
these models and formula in greater depth.
3.2 Notation
We begin by presenting the notation used in this section. We
express our models and invariants using a simplified form of
linear temporal logic (LTL) [24] of events, with past operators.
We restrict ourselves to safety properties, and hence only
need to model events occurring in the past or events that hold
globally for all of time. We use LTL for ease of presentation;
VMN automatically converts LTL formulas into first-order
logic (as required by Z3) by explicitly quantifying over time.
Our formulas are expressed in terms of three events:
snd(s,d, p), the event where a node (end host, switch or mid-
dlebox) s sends packet p to node d; and rcv(d,s, p), the event
where a node d receives a packet p from node s, and f ail(n),
the event where a node n has failed. Each event happens at a
timestep and logical formulas can refer either to events that
occurred in the past (represented using♦) or properties that
hold at all times (represented using 2). For example,
∀d,s, p : 2(rcv(d,s, p) =⇒ ♦snd(s,d, p))
says that at all times, any packet p received by node d from
node s must have been sent by s in the past.
Similarly,
∀p : 2¬rcv(d,s, p)
indicates that d will never receive any packet from s.
Header fields and abstract packet classes are represented
using functions, e.g., src(p) and dst(p) represent the source
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Listing 1: Model for a learning firewall
1 @FailClosed
2 class LearningFirewall (acl: Set[(Address,
↪→ Address)]) {
3 val established : Set[Flow]
4 def model (p: Packet) = {
5 when established.contains(flow(p)) =>
6 forward (Seq(p))
7 when acl.contains((p.src, p.dest)) =>
8 established += flow(p)
9 forward(Seq(p))
10 _ =>
11 forward(Seq.empty)
12 }
13 }
and destination address for packet p, and skype?(p) returns
true if and only if p belongs to a Skype session.
3.3 Reachability Invariants
Reachability invariants can be be generally specifies as:
∀n, p : 2¬(rcv(d,n, p)∧ predicate(p)),
which says that node d should never receive a packet p that
matches predicate(p). The predicate can be expressed in
terms of packet-header fields, abstract packet classes and past
events, this allows us to express a wide variety of network
properties as reachability invariants, e.g.,:
• Simple isolation: node d should never receive a packet
with source address s. We express this invariant using the
src function, which extracts the source IP address from the
packet header:
∀n, p :2¬(rcv(d,n, p)∧ src(p) = s).
• Flow isolation: node d can only receive packets from s
if they belong to a previously established flow. We express
this invariant using the f low function, which computes a flow
identifier based on the packet header:
∀n0, p0,n1, p1 :2¬(rcv(d,n0, p0)∧ src(p0) = s∧
¬(♦snd(d,n1, p1)∧ f low(p1) = f low(p0))).
• Data isolation: node d cannot access any data origi-
nating at server s, this requires that d should not access
data either by directly contacting s or indirectly through
network elements such as content cache. We express this
invariant using an origin function, that computes the origin
of a packet’s data based on the packet header (e.g., using the
x-http-forwarded-for field in HTTP):
∀n, p :2¬(rcv(d,n, p)∧origin(p) = s).
In addition, VMN can verify several other invariants, includ-
ing whether packets traverse a certain link or middlebox.
3.4 Modeling Middleboxes
Middleboxes in VMN are modeled using a high-level loop-
free, event driven language. Restricting the language so it
is loop free allows us to ensure that middlebox models are
expressible in first-order logic (and can serve as input to Z3).
We use the event-driven structure to translate this code to
logical formulae (axioms) encoding middlebox behavior.
Middlebox models are specified as a class containing the
abstract packet classes the middlebox depends on, its for-
warding model, and its failure behavior. Abstract packet
classes are specified as a set of function prototypes. Option-
ally, models can also specify input constraint that must be
met for the implementation to correctly identify that a packet
belongs to a particular class, and output constraints restricting
the set of classes a packet can belong to. For example, an
application firewall might specify an abstract packet class for
each application (e.g., skype?, jabber?), specify that cor-
rect identification requires all packets in a flow to go through
the same middlebox instance, and specify that a packet can
belong to at most one application class (a packet cannot
be both a Skype packet and a Jabber packet). Middlebox
forwarding models are specified as functions which dictate
how packets are modified and whether they are forwarded or
dropped. Complex packet modification, e.g., encryption or
compression, are modeled as replacing the appropriate packet
header field (or payload) with a random value, this provides
sufficient fidelity for checking reachability invariants. Finally,
middlebox failure behavior is specified either explicitly in
the forwarding model, using the fail predicate provided
by VMN, or implicitly by specifying whether a middlebox
fails-closed (i.e., packets are dropped during middlebox fail-
ures) or fails-open (i.e., all received packets are forwarded
unmodified during failure). We provide examples of such
specification below.
Listing 1 shows the specification for a stateful firewall. The
model accepts a set of ACLs (acl on Line 2) as configuration,
and maintains flow state (in the established variable de-
fined on Line 3). On receiving a packet from an established
flow, the firewall forwards the packet (Line 5 and 6), other-
wise it checks to see if the packet is permitted by the firewall
configuration (Line 6–10). The firewall forwards the packet
if permitted and drops it otherwise. The @FailClosed an-
notation on line 1 indicates that the firewall fails closed, and
packets are dropped during failure.
Similarly, Listing 2 shows the model for a NAT. In this
example we explicitly model failure behavior (Line 6), and
the NAT drops packets when failed. We also modify the
packet’s source and destination port (Line 10–11, 14–15, and
20–21) as a part of the forwarding behavior. We assign ports
to new flows at random by calling the remapped_port
(line 2) method.
VMN translates these high-level specifications into a set
of parametrized axioms (the parameters allow more than one
instance of the same middlebox to be used in a network). For
instance, Listing 1 results in the following axioms:
established( f low(p)) =⇒ (♦((¬ f ail(f))∧ (♦rcv(f, p))))
∧acl(src(p),dst(p))
send(f, p) =⇒ (♦rcv(f, p))
∧ (acl(src(p),dst(p))
∨ established( f low(p)))
The bold-faced terms in this axiom are parameters: for each
stateful firewall that appears in a network, VMN adds a new
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Listing 2: Model for a NAT
1 class NAT (nat_address: Address){
2 abstract remapped_port (p: Packet): int
3 val active : Map[Flow, int]
4 val reverse : Map[port, (Address, int)]
5 def model (p: Packet) = {
6 when fail(this) =>
7 forward(Seq.empty)
8 dst(p) == nat_address =>
9 (dst, port) = reverse[dst_port(p)];
10 dst(p) = dst;
11 dst_port(p) = port;
12 forward(Seq(p))
13 active.contains(flow(p)) =>
14 src(p) = nat_address;
15 src_port(p) = active(flow(p));
16 forward(Seq(p))
17 _ =>
18 address = src(p);
19 port = src_port(p)
20 src(p) = nat_address;
21 src_port(p) = remapped_port(p);
22 active(flow(p)) = src_port(p);
23 reverse(src_port(p)) = (address, port);
24 forward(Seq(p))
25 }
26 }
axiom by replacing the terms f, acl and established with
a new instance specific term. The first axiom says that the
established set contains a flow if a packet permitted by the
firewall policy (acl) has been received by f since it last failed.
The second one states that packets sent by f must have been
previously received by it, and are either pr emitted by the
acl’s for that firewall, or belong to a previously established
connection. The axioms generated for the NAT are similar,
and are elided due to space constraints.
We require users of VMN to provide middlebox models,
however our models are at a high level and depend only on
the type of the middlebox, not its placement or implementa-
tion details. Previous studies have found that only a limited
number of middlebox types are widely deployed [8] in pro-
duction networks6, and we believe that in a majority of cases
users of our tool can reuse existing models.
3.5 Modeling Networks
VMN uses transfer functions which were previously devel-
oped by HSA [20] and VeriFlow [21] to specify a network’s
forwarding behavior during a particular failure scenario. The
transfer function for a network is a function from a located
packet (a packet augmented with the network port where it
is located) to a set of located packets indicating where the
packets are next sent. For example, the transfer function for a
network with 3 hosts A (with IP address a), B (with IP address
6The existence of a limited number of middlebox types does not
limit the number of deployed middleboxes. Networks commonly
include several middleboxes belonging to the same type, this might
be for resilience, improving network performance and to reduce the
load on each middlebox.
b) and C (with IP address c) is given by:
f (p, port)≡

(p,A) if dst(p) = a
(p,B) if dst(p) = b
(p,C) if dst(p) = c
VMN assumes switch forwarding tables are static, how-
ever they might change depending on the failure scenario.
Therefore, rather than accepting a single static network topol-
ogy and configuration as input, VMN accepts a topology
and forwarding table corresponding to each failure scenario.
Given the topology and switch forwarding tables used by the
network in a particular failure scenario, VMN uses VeriFlow
to compute a transfer function. In this computed transfer func-
tion, all ports correspond to either middleboxes or end-hosts,
i.e., the transfer function models the network as a set of end-
hosts and middleboxes connected to a single switch. VMN
translates this transfer function to axioms by introducing a
single pseudo-node (Ω) representing the network, and deriv-
ing a set of axioms for this pseudo-node from the transfer
function and failure scenario. For example, the previous trans-
fer function is translated to the following axioms ( f ail(X)
here represents the specified failure model).
∀n, p :2 f ail(X)∧ . . .snd(A,n, p) =⇒ n =Ω
∀n, p :2 f ail(X)∧ . . .snd(Ω,n, p)∧dst(p) = a
=⇒ n = A∧♦∃n′ : rcv(n′,Ω, p)
VeriFlow (and HSA) can only produce transfer functions
when the topology and forwarding table for a network are
loop-free. VMN therefore throws an exception when a static
forwarding loop is encountered. Not allowing loops in the
forwarding logic is also important for allowing us to express
network axioms in first-order logic and helps ensure VMN’s
verification process is decidable.
In addition to the axioms for middlebox behavior and net-
work behavior, VMN also adds axioms restricting the oracles’
behavior, e.g., we add axioms to ensure that any packet de-
livery event scheduled by the scheduling oracle has a corre-
sponding packet send event, and we ensure that new packets
generated by hosts are well formed.
3.6 Limitations
To ensure verification is practical and tractable, our models
of networks and middleboxes are necessarily abstract. This
imposes some limitations for the results returned by VMN.
Firstly, we do not verify the classification logic in a middle-
box implementation, our verification results are conditioned
on packets being correctly classified by the middlebox. There-
fore, our results might be wrong when classification logic is
incorrectly implemented. This is a separable problem: VMN
does not obviate the need to verify and test individual mid-
dleboxes, it just provides a mechanism to verify the behavior
of combined middleboxes. Providing tools to test or verify
individual middleboxes is outside scope of our work.
Secondly, we do not have complete semantic information
about abstract packet classes, and this can result in VMN
reporting false positives (i.e., invariant violations) where none
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exist. For example, consider a network with two application
specific firewalls, one that can identify Skype traffic, and
another that can identify streaming audio services. A priori,
VMN has no information indicating that these packet classes
are mutually exclusive, and will consider packets which meet
both criterion when looking for invariant violations. This
can be solved by augmenting VMN’s models with logical
constraints encoding these assumptions, however we do not
currently include such constraints.
Finally, our models do not contain semantics for complex
packet modifications (e.g., encryption, compression, etc.),
and instead just change the affected packet to a random value.
Similar to the previous cases this can also result in false
positives in the same way as above.
Most of these limitations are fundamental, network veri-
fication without the use of abstractions is intractable, and is
impractical with large models. Our choices allow us to pro-
vide useful verification, as shown §5, and in most practical
cases we observed no false positives.
4 Scaling Verification
Z3 (and other SMT solvers) rely on heuristics and timers to
ensure satisfiability checking terminates, and cannot always
prove (or disprove) satisfiability of large sets of formulae. The
size of formulae produced by the techniques in §3 are propor-
tional to the size of the network being verified, and therefore
cannot be applied to large networks. Scaling therefore re-
quires that the size of the formulae generated be independent
of network size. We rely on network slices as described here.
We begin by providing an informal overview of network
slices, a more formal description is available in our technical
report.7 Given a network N, a subnetwork Ω is a network
formed from a subset of N’s nodes (middleboxes, hosts and
switches) and links. All packets sent by hosts in subnetwork
Ω and received by hosts in Ω are said to belong to Ω. We
say Ω is closed under forwarding if and only if all packets
belonging to Ω are only forwarded to nodes in Ω.
Define a network N’s state to be the cartesian product of
the state in all middleboxes in N. We say some state s is
reachable in N if and only if there exists a schedule (given by
the output of the scheduling oracle) at the end of which the
network has state s. A subnetwork Ω of network N is then
closed under state if and only if there exists an equivalence
relation between states in Ω and states in N such that for all
states reachable in N, the equivalent state is reachable in Ω,
and vice versa.
A slice is a subnetwork that is both closed under forward-
ing and state. Any invariant referencing only nodes and pack-
ets belonging to a slice holds in the original network if and
only if it holds in the slice. Consider an invariant I that is
violated in some network N. Proving that an invariant is vi-
olated is equivalent to finding a schedule S (i.e., a sequence
of events) which lead to the invariant being violated. Now
7Anonymized for double blind submission, we can provide proofs
and other details on request.
consider Ω, a slice of N, such that I only references nodes
and packets belonging toΩ. Intuitively, the closure properties
imply that there exists a schedule S′ for Ω that is equivalent
to S. Furthermore, this equivalence implies that S′ also leads
to I being violated in Ω. Finally, note that Ω is a subnetwork
of N, and hence any schedule for Ω is also a schedule for N.
4.1 Finding Slices
Networks with arbitrary middleboxes need not have slices
smaller than the network as a whole. However, we find there
is a class of networks that do have slices that do not grow
with the size of the overall network. These special networks,
which we now focus on, obey the following conditions: (a)
any middleboxes used in these networks be flow-parallel, or
origin-agnostic, (b) network policies be such that we can
divide hosts in the network into a set of policy equivalence
classes, two hosts are in the same equivalence class if all
packets sent and received by them traverse the same set of
middlebox types, and are treated according to the same policy,
(c) the number of policy classes be independent of the size of
the network, (d) the network’s forwarding graph is finite, and
(e) the size of forwarding graphs is independent of network
size. We define our restrictions in greater detail below.
A middlebox is flow-parallel if middlebox state is parti-
tioned by flows, and a flow’s state is accessed only when
processing that flow; e.g., stateful firewalls maintain state
about whether a particular flow is allowed, however this state
does not affect other flows, nor is it updated by any other flow.
A middlebox is origin-agnostic if it is not flow-parallel (i.e.,
state is shared across flows) and its behavior is agnostic to
which flows (and hence hosts) instantiated the state. For ex-
ample, the behavior of content-caches often does not depend
on the connection that led to content being cached.
Any subnetwork that contains only flow-parallel middle-
boxes and is closed under forwarding is also closed under
state; the set of packets belonging to the subnetwork can
be naturally mapped to a set of flows belonging to the sub-
network, and the state for those flows can only be affected
by nodes in the subnetwork. Therefore, finding a slice in a
network containing only flow-parallel middleboxes is equiv-
alent to finding a subnetwork that is closed under forward-
ing. Therefore, verifying an invariant in a network with only
flow-parallel middleboxes only requires that we consider a
subnetwork that is closed under forwarding and includes all
nodes specified by the invariant. Since we assumed the size
of the forwarding graph is finite and independent of network
size, this means that the slices used to verify invariants in
such networks are also finite.
A subnetwork that is closed under forwarding and con-
tains only origin-agnostic or flow-parallel middleboxes is
closed under state if and only if it includes a node from each
policy class. This is because all nodes in the same policy
class are equivalent for origin-agnostic middleboxes, i.e.,
the middlebox cannot distinguish between hosts in the same
equivalence class, ensuring that the slice is closed under state.
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Figure 1: Topology for a datacenter network with middle-
boxes from [34]. The topology contains firewalls (FW),
load balancers (LB) and intrusion detection and prevention
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each.
Therefore, when networks meet our requirements, all reacha-
bility invariants can be verified in network slices whose size
is independent of network size.
Finally, we note that our restrictions are commonly met
by deployed networks: previous studies have shown that fire-
walls, proxies and IDSes are the most commonly deployed
middlebox types; of these firewalls are flow-parallel, most
proxies are origin-agnostic and many IDSes are off path and
do not affect reachability invariants. Furthermore, IDSes can
be safely treated as origin-agnostic middleboxes in VMN,
without loss in verification fidelity. For ease of management,
network policy in large deployed networks is commonly ex-
pressed in terms of policy classes, and the forwarding graph
is restricted for performance. Therefore, we do not believe
these restrictions pose a severe challenge for VMN. Finally,
VMN can still be used to verify moderate sized networks
which violate these restrictions.
4.2 Network Symmetry
Slices allow us to scale verification of an individual invariant,
however a single network might enforce several invariants,
and the number of invariants might grow with network size.
However, networks are often symmetric with respect to pol-
icy classes, i.e., packets whose source and destination belong
to the same policy class traverse the same sequence of mid-
dlebox types. When possible VMN takes advantage of this
symmetry to reduce the number of invariants to be verified.
We say two invariants are symmetric when one can be trans-
formed to another by replacing nodes with other nodes in
the same policy class. If an invariant I holds in a symmetric
network, then so do all invariants symmetric to I. When net-
works are symmetric, VMN uses this observation to divide
invariants into symmetric groups and proves just one invari-
ant in each symmetry group, allowing us to eliminate many
invariant checks.
5 Evaluation
To evaluate VMN we first examine how it would deal with
several real-world scenarios and then investigate how it scales
to large networks. We ran our evaluation on servers running
10-core, 2.6GHz Intel Xeon processors with 256 GB of RAM.
We report times taken when verification is performed using a
single core. Verification can be trivially parallelized over mul-
tiple invariants. We used Z3 version 4.4.2 for our evaluation.
SMT solvers rely on randomized search algorithms, and their
performance can vary widely across runs. The results reported
here are generated from 100 runs of each experiment.
5.1 Real-World Evaluation
A previous measurement study [34] looked at more than 10
datacenters over a 2 year period, and found that configura-
tion bugs (in both middleboxes and networks) are a frequent
cause of failure. Furthermore, the study analyzed the use of
redundant middleboxes for fault tolerance, and found that
redundancy failed due to misconfiguration roughly 33% of
the time. Here we show how VMN can detect and prevent the
three most common classes of configuration errors, including
errors affecting fault tolerance. For our evaluation we use a
datacenter topology (Figure 1) containing 1000 end hosts and
three types of middleboxes: stateful firewalls, load balancers
and intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs). We
use redundant instances of these middleboxes for fault toler-
ance. For each scenario we report time taken to verify a single
invariant (Figure 2), and time taken to verify all invariants
(Figure 3); and show how these times grow as a function
of policy complexity (as measured by the number of policy
equivalence classes). Each box and whisker plot shows mini-
mum, 5th percentile, median, 95th percentile and maximum
time for verification.
Incorrect Firewall Rules: According to [34], 70% of all
reported middlebox misconfiguration are attributed to incor-
rect rules installed in firewalls. To evaluate this scenario we
begin by assigning each host to one of a few policy groups.8
We then add firewall rules to prevent hosts in one group from
communicating with hosts in any other group. We introduce
misconfiguration by deleting a random set of these firewall
rules. We use VMN to identify for which hosts the desired
invariant holds (i.e., that hosts can only communicate with
other hosts in the same group). Note that all middleboxes
in this evaluation are flow-parallel, and hence the size of a
slice on which invariants are verified is independent of both
policy complexity and network size. In our evaluation, we
found that VMN correctly identified all violations, and did
8Note, policy groups are distinct from policy equivalence class; a
policy group signifies how a network administrator might group
hosts while configuring the network, however policy equivalence
classes are assigned based on the actual network configuration.
8
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
 500
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Ti
m
e 
(s
ec
on
ds
)
# of Policy Equivalence Classes
Time to Prove Invariant Violation
Time to Prove Invariant Holds
Figure 4: Time taken to verify each data isolation invariant. The shaded region
represents the 5th–95th percentile time.
 0
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
 14000
10 25 50 75 100
Ti
m
e 
(S
)
# of Policy Equivalence Classes
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in §5.2.
not report any false positives. The time to verify a single in-
variant is shown in Figure 2 under Rules. When verifying the
entire network, we only need to verify as many invariants as
policy equivalence classes; hosts affected by misconfigured
firewall rules fall in their own policy equivalence class, since
removal of rules breaks symmetry. Figure 3 (Rules) shows
how whole network verification time scales as a function of
policy complexity.
Misconfigured Redundant Firewalls Redundant fire-
walls are often misconfigured so that they do not provide
fault tolerance. To show that VMN can detect such errors we
took the networks used in the preceding simulations (in their
properly configured state) and introduced misconfiguration
by removing rules from some of the backup firewall. In this
case invariant violation would only occur when middleboxes
fail. We found VMN correctly identified all such violations,
and we show the time taken for each invariant in Figure 2
under “Redundant”, and time taken for the whole network in
Figure 3.
Misconfigured Redundant Routing Another way that re-
dundancy can be rendered ineffective by misconfiguration is
if routing (after failures) allows packets to bypass the mid-
dleboxes specified in the pipeline invariants. To test this we
considered, for the network described above, an invariant
requiring that all packet in the network traverse an IDPS be-
fore being delivered to the destination host. We changed a
randomly selected set of routing rules so that some packets
would be routed around the redundant IDPS when the primary
had failed. VMN correctly identified all such violations, and
we show times for individual and overall network verification
under “Traversal” in Figures 2 and 3.
We can thus see that verification, as provided by VMN,
can be used to prevent many of the configuration bugs re-
ported to affect today’s production datacenters. Moreover, the
verification time scales linearly with the number of policy
equivalence classes (with a slope of about three invariants
per second). We now turn to more complicated invariants
involving data isolation.
5.2 Data Isolation
Modern data centers also run storage services such as S3 [2],
AWS Glacier [1], and Azure Blob Store [3]. These storage ser-
vices must comply with legal and customer requirements [32]
limiting access to this data. Operators often add caches to
these services to improve performance and reduce the load
on the storage servers themselves, but if these caches are
misplaced or misconfigured then the access policies could be
violated. VMN can verify these data isolation invariants.
To evaluate this functionality, we used the topology (and
correct configuration) from §5.1 and added a few content
caches by connecting them to top of rack switches. We also
assume that each policy group contains separate servers with
private data (only accessible within the policy group), and
servers with public data (accessible by everyone). We then
consider a scenario where a network administrator inserts
caches to reduce load on these data servers. The content
cache is configured with ACL entries9 that can implement
this invariant. Similar to the case above, we introduce con-
figuration errors by deleting a random set of ACLs from the
content cache and firewalls.
We use VMN to verify data isolation invariants in this
network (i.e., ensure that private data is only accessible from
within the same policy group, and public data is accessible
from everywhere). VMN correctly detects invariant viola-
tions, and does not report any false positives. Content caches
are origin agnostic, and hence the size of a slice used to ver-
ify these invariants depends on policy complexity. Figure 4
shows how time taken for verifying each invariant varies with
the number of policy equivalence classes. In a network with
100 different policy equivalence classes, verification takes
less than 4 minutes on average. Also observe that the vari-
ance for verifying a single invariant grows with the size of
slices used. This shows one of the reasons why the ability to
use slices and minimize the size of the network on which an
invariant is verified is important. Figure 5 shows time taken
to verify the entire network as we increase the number of
policy equivalence classes.
9This is a common feature supported by most open source and
commercial caches.
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Figure 6: Topology for enterprise network used in §5.3.1,
containing a firewall (FW) and a gateway (GW).
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shows time taken to verify a slice, which is independent of
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5.3 Other Network Scenarios
We next apply VMN to several other scenarios that illustrate
the value of slicing (and symmetry) in reducing verification
time.
5.3.1 Enterprise Network with Firewall
First, we consider a typical enterprise or university network
protected by a stateful firewall, shown in Figure 6. The net-
work interconnects three types of hosts:
1. Hosts in public subnets should be allowed to both initi-
ate and accept connections with the outside world.
2. Hosts in private subnets should be flow-isolated (i.e.,
allowed to initiate connections to the outside world, but never
accept incoming connections).
3. Hosts in quarantined subnets should be node-isolated
(i.e., not allowed to communicate with the outside world).
We vary the number of subnets keeping the proportion of
subnet types fixed; a third of the subnets are public, a third
are private and a third are quarantined.
We configure the firewall so as to enforce the target in-
variants correctly: with two rules denying access (in either
direction) for each quarantined subnet, plus one rule denying
inbound connections for each private subnet. The results we
present below are for the case where all the target invariants
hold. Since this network only contains a firewall, using slices
we can verify invariants on a slice whose size is independent
of network size and policy complexity. We can also leverage
the symmetry in both network and policy to reduce the num-
ber of invariants that need to be verified for the network. In
contrast, when slices and symmetry are not used, the model
for verifying each invariant grows as the size of the network,
and we have to verify many more invariants. In Figure 7 we
show time taken to verify the invariant using slices (Slice) and
how verification time varies with network size when slices
are not used.
5.3.2 Multi-Tenant Datacenter
Next, we consider how VMN can be used by a cloud provider
(e.g., Amazon) to verify isolation in a multi-tenant datacenter.
We assume that the datacenter implements the Amazon EC2
Security Groups model [4]. For our test we considered a
datacenter with 600 physical servers (which each run a virtual
switch) and 210 physical switches (which implement equal
cost multi-path routing). Tenants launch virtual machines
(VMs), which are run on physical servers and connect to the
network through virtual switches. Each virtual switch acts
as a stateful firewall, and defaults to denying all traffic (i.e.,
packets not specifically allowed by an ACL are dropped).
To scale policy enforcement, VMs are organized in security
groups with associated accept/deny rules. For our evaluation,
we considered a case where each tenant organizes their VMs
into two security groups:
1. VMs that belong to the public security group are al-
lowed to accept connections from any VMs.
2. VMs that belong to the private security group are flow-
isolated (i.e., they can initiate connections to other tenants’
VMs, but can only accept connections from this tenant’s
public and private VMs).
We also assume that firewall configuration is specified in
terms of security groups (i.e., on receiving a packet the fire-
wall computes the security group to which the sender and
receiver belong and applies ACLs appropriately). For this
evaluation, we configured the network to correctly enforce
tenant policies. We added two ACL rules for each tenant’s
public security group allowing incoming and outgoing pack-
ets to anyone, while we added three rules for private security
groups; two allowing incoming and outgoing traffic from
the tenant’s VM, and one allowing outgoing traffic to other
tenants. For our evaluation we consider a case where each
tenant has 10 VMs, 5 public and 5 private, which are spread
across physical servers. These rules result in flow-parallel
middleboxes, so we can use fixed size slices to verify each
invariant. The number of invariants that need to be verified
grow as a function of the number of tenants. In Figure 8 we
show time taken to verify one instance of the invariant when
slices are used (Slice) and how verification time varies with
network size when slices are not used. The invariants checked
are: (a) private hosts in one group cannot reach private hosts
in another group (Priv-Priv), (b) public hosts in one group
cannot reach private hosts in another group (Priv-Pub), and (c)
private hosts in one group can reach public hosts in another.
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Figure 9: (a) shows the pipeline at each peering point for an ISP; (b) distribution of time to verify each invariant given this pipeline when the ISP peers with other networks at 5
locations; (c) average time to verify each invariant when the ISP has 75 subnets. In both cases, to the left of the black line we show time to verify on a slice (which is independent of
network size) and vary sizes to the right.
5.3.3 ISP with Intrusion Detection
Finally, we consider an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that
implements an intrusion detection system (IDS). We model
our network on the SWITCHlan backbone [41], and assume
that there is an IDS box and a stateful firewall at each peer-
ing point (Figure 9(a)). The ISP contains public, private and
quarantined subnets (with policies as defined in §5.3.1) and
the stateful firewalls enforce the corresponding invariants.
Additionally, each IDS performs lightweight monitoring (e.g.,
based on packet or byte counters) and checks whether a par-
ticular destination prefix (e.g., a customer of the ISP) might
be under attack; if so, all traffic to this prefix is rerouted to
a scrubbing box that performs more heavyweight analysis,
discards any part of the traffic that it identifies as “attack traf-
fic,” and forwards the rest to the intended destination. This
combination of multiple lightweight IDS boxes and one (or a
few) centralized scrubbing boxes is standard practice in ISPs
that offer attack protection to their customers.10
To enforce the target invariants (for public, private, and
quarantined subnets) correctly, all inbound traffic must go
through at least one stateful firewall. We consider a miscon-
figuration where traffic rerouted by a given IDS box to the
scrubbing box bypasses all stateful firewalls. As a result, any
part of this rerouted traffic that is not discarded by the scrub-
bing box can reach private or quarantined subnets, violating
the (simple or flow-) isolation of the corresponding hosts.
When verifying invariants in a slice we again take advan-
tage of the fact that firewalls and IDSes are flow-parallel.11
For each subnet, we can verify invariants in a slice contain-
ing a peering point, a host from the subnet, the appropriate
firewall, IDS and a scrubber. Furthermore, since all subnets
belong to one of three policy equivalence classes, and the
network is symmetric, we only need run verification on three
slices.
We begin by evaluating a case where the ISP, similar to the
SWITCHlan backbone has 5 peering points with other net-
works. We measure verification time as we vary the number
10This setup is preferred to installing a separate scrubbing box at
each peering point because of the high cost of these boxes, which
can amount to several million dollars for a warranteed period of 3
years.
11While IDSes in general might not be flow-parallel, the specific IDS
used here is flow-parallel with respect to a slice.
of subnets (Figure 9(b)), and report time taken, on average, to
verify each invariant. When slices are used, the median time
for verifying an invariant is 0.21 seconds, by contrast when
verification is performed on the entire network, a network
with 250 subnets takes approximately 6 minutes to verify.
Furthermore, when verifying all invariants, only 3 slices need
to be verified when we account for symmetry, otherwise the
number of invariants verified grows with network size.
In Figure 9(c) we hold the number of subnets constant
(at 75) and show verification time as we vary the number of
peering points. In this case the complexity of verifying the
entire network grows more quickly (because the IDS model is
more complex leading to a larger increase in problem size). In
this case, verifying correctness for a network with 50 peering
points, when verification is performed on the whole entire
network, takes approximately 10 minutes. Hence, being able
to verify slices and use symmetry is crucial when verifying
such networks.
6 Related Work
Next, we discuss related work in network verification and
formal methods.
Testing Networks with Middleboxes The work most closely
related to us is Buzz [13], which uses symbolic execution
to generate sequences of packets that can be used to test
whether a network enforces an invariant. Testing, as provided
by Buzz, is complimentary to verification. Our verification
process does not require sending traffic through the network,
and hence provides a non-disruptive mechanism for ensur-
ing that changes to a network (i.e., changing middlebox or
routing configuration, adding new types of middleboxes, etc.)
do not result in invariant violation. Verification is also use-
ful when initially designing a network, since designs can be
evaluated to ensure they uphold desirable invariants. How-
ever, as we have noted in §3.6, our verification results hold
if and only if middlebox implementations are correct, i.e.,
packets are correctly classified, etc. Combining a verification
tool like VMN with a testing tool such as Buzz allows us
to circumvent this problem, when possible (i.e., when the
network is not heavily utilized, or when adding new types
of middleboxes), Buzz can be used to test if invariants hold.
This is similar to the complimentary use of verification and
testing in software development today. More specifically, it is
11
almost identical to the relationship between ATPG (testing)
and HSA (verification).
Beyond the difference of purpose, there are some other
crucial difference between Buzz and VMN: (a) Buzz’s mid-
dlebox models are context specific, and must be specialized
for each network, while VMN’s models are more general and
designed to be reused across networks; (b) Buzz’s testing
does not consider the effect of middlebox failure, while our
approach can be used to verify that invariants hold despite net-
work failures; and (c) scaling to large networks with slicing
is one of our major contributions. Buzz can scale to networks
with 100s of nodes before running into scaling limits, while
in many cases we can scale to arbitrary sized networks. We
believe slicing can also be used by Buzz to improve scaling.
SymNet [40] has also suggested the need to extend these
mechanisms to handle mutable datapath elements. SymNet
uses symbolic execution to check reachability properties,
however their technique is only applicable when state is not
shared across a flow and was only applied to cases where
the middlebox can punch holes, but do no more. They can
therefore only deal with a few kinds of middleboxes, and it is
unclear if their technique can be extended to scalably handle
other middlebox types.
Verifying Forwarding Rules Recent efforts in network ver-
ification [5, 7, 15, 20, 21, 26, 36, 38] have focused on verify-
ing the network dataplane by analyzing forwarding tables.
Some of these tools including HSA [19], Libra [46] and
VeriFlow [21] have also developed algorithms to perform
near real-time verification of simple properties such as loop-
freedom and the absence of blackholes. Recent work [33] has
also shown how techniques similar to slicing can be used to
scale these techniques. Our approach to slicing generalizes
this work by accounting for state. While these techniques are
well suited for checking networks with static data planes they
are insufficient for dynamic datapaths.
Verifying Network Updates Another line of network ver-
ification research has focused on verification during con-
figuration updates. This line of work can be used to verify
the consistency of routing tables generated by SDN con-
trollers [18, 42]. Recent efforts [25] have generalized these
mechanisms and can be used to determine what parts of the
configuration are affected by an update, and verify invariants
on this subset of the configuration. This line of work has been
restricted to analyzing policy updates performed by the con-
trol plane and does not address dynamic data plane elements
where state updates are more frequent.
Verifying Network Applications Other work has looked at
verifying the correctness of control and data plane applica-
tions. NICE [7] proposed using static analysis to verify the
correctness of controller programs. Later extensions includ-
ing [23] have looked at improving the accuracy of NICE
using concolic testing [35] at the cost of completeness. More
recently, Vericon [6] has looked at sound verification of a
restricted class of controllers.
Recent work [11] has also looked at using symbolic execu-
tion to prove properties for programmable datapaths (middle-
boxes). This work in particular looked at verifying bounded
execution, crash freedom and that certain packets are fil-
tered for stateless or simple stateful middleboxes written
as pipelines and meeting certain criterion. The verification
technique does not scale to middleboxes like content caches
which maintain arbitrary state.
Finite State Model Checking Finite state model checking
has been applied to check the correctness of many hardware
and software based systems [9]. Here the behavior of a sys-
tem is specified as a transition relation between finite state
and a checker can verify that all reachable states from a start-
ing configuration are safe (i.e., do not cause any invariant
violation). Tools such as NICE [7], HSA [20] and others [39]
rely on this technique. However these techniques scale expo-
nentially with the number of states and for even moderately
large problems one must choose between being able to verify
in reasonable time and completeness. Our use of SMT solvers
allows us to reason about potentially infinite state and our use
of simple logic allows verification to terminate in a decidable
manner for practical networks.
Language Abstractions Several recent works in software-
defined networking [14, 16, 22, 30, 44] have proposed the use
of verification friendly languages for controllers. One could
similarly extend this concept to provide a verification friendly
data plane language however our approach is orthogonal
to such a development: we aim at proving network wide
properties rather than properties for individual middleboxes.
7 Conclusion
We started this work aiming to extend the benefits of verifi-
cation to networks with middleboxes. In building VMN, we
had three significant realizations: first, we should separate the
classification and forwarding behavior of middleboxes, and
only abstractly model classification. Second, scaling verifica-
tion requires us to take advantage of how state is partitioned
by middleboxes, and of the symmetry in the network topology
and policies. Lastly, verifying invariants in the presence of
failures is essential to making middlebox verification useful
in existing networks. The combination of the first two steps
enables verification of reachability invariants on extremely
large networks; while the last allows us to verify most previ-
ously reported configuration bugs. Since our results depend
on network symmetry they do not entirely apply to random
networks, and scalability for general networks remains an
important open problem. However, we note that in other do-
mains where verification has been successfully employed,
scaling has been achieved by taking advantage of the prob-
lem structure, and we believe our work on slices is analogous
to this work.
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